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People favor or are opposed to immigration for a variety of  reasons. It is therefore dif-
ficult to tie views about immigration to ideological positions. While it seems obvious 
that political conservatives are the most unlikely to defend freedom of  movement, 
and that socialists and liberals (classical and modern) are very likely to favor more open 
borders, in reality wariness (if  not outright hostility) to immigration can be found 
among all groups. Even libertarian anarchists have advanced reasons to restrict the 
movement of  peoples.
The purpose of  this chapter is to make a case for greater freedom of  movement or, 
simply, freedom of  immigration. Its aim is to defend immigration against critics of  all 
stripes, and also to defend immigration against some of  its less enthusiastic friends.
To put a case for free immigration is not easy. Though it may be simple enough to 
enunciate political principles and stand doggedly by them, in questions of  public policy 
coherence and consistency are merely necessary, but not sufficient, virtues. The feasibil-
ity of  any policy proposal is also important, and political theory needs to be alive to this. 
“How open can borders be?” is an obvious question that it may not be possible to evade. 
The defense of  free immigration offered here is, I hope, sensitive to this requirement. 
Nonetheless, it is an important part of  its purpose to suggest that, in the end, political 
theory needs also to be suspicious of  feasibility considerations, particularly when they 
lead us to morally troubling conclusions.
Before proceeding to the defense of  free immigration, however, it will be important 
to understand what precisely immigration amounts to, and to recognize the nature of  
the problem of  immigration as it exists in the world today. This is the task of  the first 
section of  this chapter. The second section defines and offers a short defense of  free 
immigration. The three sections that follow then consider various challenges to the 
principle of  free immigration coming from economic, national, and security perspec-
tives, and argue that each challenge can be met. The final section offers some general 
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 The Case for Open Immigration  377
reflections on the dilemmas of  contemporary immigration policy, before restating more 
forcefully the case for the free movement of  peoples.
The Problem of  Immigration in the Modern World
Toward the end of  the twentieth century, more than 100 million people lived outside of  
the states of  which they are citizens (Trebilcock, 1995, p. 219). But this figure does not 
come close to identifying the numbers of  people who are moving about from country to 
country across the globe. Many people move between countries as tourists, businessmen, 
sportswomen or performers without ever stopping to “live” in a country – let alone with 
any intention to settle in a foreign land. Global human movement is a fact of  life, as it has 
been for centuries, if  not for all of  human history. This has always had its own difficulties. 
But the problem of  immigration is a problem of  a particular kind, for immigrants are 
people who aim to stop rather than simply to pass through – though, as we shall see, the 
definition of  “stopping” is not an easy one to establish. The migration of  people is a 
problem in the modern world because that world is a world of  states, and states guard 
(sometimes jealously) the right to determine who may settle within their borders. Immi-
gration may be defined as the movement of  a person or persons from one state into 
another for the purpose of  temporary or permanent settlement (Kukathas, 2002).
Modern states are reluctant to allow people to enter and settle within their borders 
at will for a variety of  reasons. Security is one important consideration, though differ-
ent states have different security concerns. The United States at present fears terrorist 
attacks and has tightened its immigration laws in part because of  concerns for the 
safety of  its citizens. China, on the other hand, has different security concerns since its 
political system does not permit much internal freedom of  movement and could not 
tolerate an uncontrolled influx of  foreigners into a population that harbors dissidents 
who would challenge the authority of  the government. For states such as Israel, secu-
rity is a prominent concern, but perhaps one no more important than the desire to 
preserve a certain cultural integrity. A state founded as a Jewish homeland cannot 
allow immigration to transform it into a multicultural polity.
For modern liberal democratic states, however, there are a number of  important 
reasons why immigration is problematic. These states, including Canada, the United 
States, Australia, Britain, and several countries in Western Europe, are particularly 
popular destinations for immigrants, whether because they are refugees seeking safe 
havens, or simply people looking to improve their prospects of  a better life. One impor-
tant reason why immigration is a problem in these cases is that immigrants impose 
costs on society even as they bring benefits. While economists tend to agree that the 
consequences of  free movement are generally positive, since competitive labor markets 
make for a more efficient use of  resources (Simon, 1990; Sykes, 1995, pp. 159–160), 
not all nations may benefit immediately from an influx of  immigrants. Nor do the 
burdens of  accommodating or adjusting to immigrants fall equally on all within a 
society – much will depend on who the immigrants are, where they settle, and with 
whom they end up competing for jobs, real estate, and public facilities. Even if  the 
benefits of  immigration outweigh the costs to the nation, those who are adversely 
affected by an influx of  settlers will object; and in liberal democratic states this will 
translate into electorally significant opposition.
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Another important reason why immigration is a problem in liberal democratic states 
is that these states are, to varying degrees, welfare states. The state in such societies 
provides a range of  benefits, including education, unemployment relief, retirement 
income, medical care, as well as numerous programs to serve particular interests. 
Immigrants are potential recipients of  these services and benefits, and any state con-
sidering the level of  immigration it will accept will have to consider how likely immi-
grants are to consume these benefits, how much they might consume, whether or not 
they are going to be able to finance the extra costs from the lifetime tax contributions 
of  these immigrants, and what are the short-term implications of  accepting immi-
grants who begin by consuming more in benefits than they pay in taxes. Consequently, 
such states are reluctant to accept immigrants who are infirm, or too old to contribute 
enough in taxes in their remaining working lives to cover the costs of  medical care and 
retirement subsidies.
Under these circumstances liberal democratic governments will go to great lengths 
to limit immigration, though they will face pressures both to admit and refuse entry to 
applicants seeking to enter their countries. The pressures to admit will come from busi-
nesses looking for cheaper labor, from humanitarian groups calling for the admission 
of  refugees, and from families and ethnic communities pressing to have relatives join 
them from their countries of  origin. The pressures to refuse entry will generally come 
from labor unions, from “nativist” groups, and from conservatives concerned about the 
cultural and economic impact of  settlers, particularly if  the settlers are predominantly 
from ethnically different countries. The lengths to which liberal democratic states might 
go to discourage immigration is well illustrated by the reaction of  the Australian gov-
ernment in August 2001 to the appearance near its coastal waters of  a Norwegian 
merchant vessel, The Tampa, bearing refugees rescued at sea. The vessel was denied 
permission to enter Australian waters and to offload its human cargo, which was 
shipped to the island of  Nauru to prevent the refugees from appealing for asylum in 
Australia (Marr and Wilkinson, 2003). More recently, the United States responded to 
the crisis in Haiti in February 2004 by intervening to encourage the departure of  
President Aristide, and to restore some degree of  order, because it feared an exodus 
of  Haitian refugees making their way to Florida.
Immigration is a problem largely because of  the nature of  the modern state. Most 
states, and certainly all liberal democratic states, regard their people as “citizens” or 
“members” of  the state. Membership is not standard, and the nature of  membership 
has a substantial bearing on the rights that individuals have within a state. Full mem-
bership might amount to citizenship and include the right to vote and stand for public 
office. (Though it is worth noting that in the United States, for example, even full citi-
zenship does not entitle a member to stand for the office of  President if  he or she was 
not born in the country.) “Permanent resident” status might give one the right to work 
and to change employer at will, and also to draw on health, education, and welfare 
services, but not provide security against deportation. Status as a “guest-worker” or 
temporary resident might provide fewer rights still. Modern states restrict immigration 
because they must manage access to the goods for which immigrants and natives would 
compete. Modern states are like clubs that are reluctant to accept new members unless 
they can be assured that they have more to gain by admitting people than they have by 
keeping them out.
<i>Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics</i>, edited by Andrew I. Cohen, and Christopher Heath Wellman, John Wiley & Sons,
         Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=1597998.
Created from smu on 2019-10-16 19:53:11.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
3.
 J
oh
n 
W
ile
y 
& 
So
ns
, I
nc
or
po
ra
te
d.
 A
ll r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
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In Defense of  Free Immigration
Given that immigrants will compete for goods and resources with natives, why should 
states open their borders when it is their task to manage affairs within their domains? 
Does the idea of  open immigration not go against the principles of  good husbandry?
There are many reasons why borders should be open and the movement of  people 
should be free. But before considering these reasons more closely, it should be admitted 
that the prospect of  states opening their borders completely is a remote one. Even as 
the European Union expands its membership and facilitates freer movement among its 
denizens, to take one possible counter-example to this claim, it continues to control 
entry into Europe – and is feeling the pressure from member states to tighten restric-
tions on entry from refugees and displaced people. “Open borders” is not a policy option 
currently being considered by any state. Nonetheless, the case for open borders should 
be considered, though in the end, as we shall see, it cannot be defended without rethink-
ing the idea of  the state.
There are two major reasons for favoring open borders. The first is a principle of  
freedom, and the second a principle of  humanity.
Open borders are consistent with – and on occasion, protect – freedom in a number 
of  ways. The first, and most obvious, is that closed borders restrict freedom of  move-
ment. Borders prevent people from moving into territories whose governments forbid 
them to enter; and to the extent that they cannot enter any other territory, borders 
confine them within their designated boundaries. This fact is not sufficient to establish 
that so confining people is indefensible; but if  freedom is held to be an important 
value, then there is at least a case for saying that very weighty reasons are necessary 
to restrict it.
Several other considerations suggest that such reasons would have to be weighty 
indeed. First, to keep borders closed would mean to keep out people who would, as a 
consequence, lose not only the freedom to move but also the freedom they might be 
seeking in an attempt to flee unjust or tyrannical regimes. The effect of  this is to deny 
people the freedom they would gain by leaving their societies and to diminish the incen-
tive of  tyrannical regimes to reform the conditions endured by their captive peoples. 
Second, closing borders means denying people the freedom to sell their labor, and 
denying others the freedom to buy it. Good reasons are needed to justify abridging this 
particular freedom, since to deny someone the liberty to exchange his labor is to deny 
him a very significant liberty. Third, and more generally, keeping borders closed would 
mean restricting people’s freedom to associate. It would require keeping apart people 
who wish to come together whether for love, or friendship, or for the sake of  fulfilling 
important duties, such as caring for children or parents.
Now, to be sure, defenders of  restricted immigration do not generally argue that 
borders should be completely sealed, or that no one should be admitted. Many concede 
that exceptions should be made for refugees, that some people should be allowed to 
come into a country to work, and that some provision should be made for admitting 
people who wish to rejoin their families. Those who want restricted or controlled immi-
gration are not indifferent to freedom. Nonetheless, even those who argue for generous 
levels of  immigration by implication maintain that people should be turned away at the 
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380  Chandran Kukathas
border. This in itself  is a limitation of  liberty, for which good reasons must be given. In 
the end, or so I will argue, the reasons that have been offered are not weighty enough 
to justify restricting freedom even to a limited degree.
The second reason for favoring open borders is a principle of  humanity. The great 
majority of  the people of  the world live in poverty, and for a significant number of  them 
the most promising way of  improving their condition is to move. This would remain 
true even if  efforts to reduce trade barriers were successful, rich countries agreed to 
invest more in poorer ones, and much greater amounts of  aid were made available 
to the developing world. For even if  the general condition of  a society were good, the 
situation of  particular individuals would often be poor, and for some of  them immigra-
tion would offer the best prospect of  improving their condition. To say to such people 
that they are forbidden to cross a border in order to improve their condition is to say to 
them that it is justified that they be denied the opportunity to get out of  poverty, or even 
destitution. And clearly there are many people who share this plight, for numerous 
illegal immigrants take substantial risks to move from one country to another – 
courting not only discomfort and even death by traveling under cover in dangerous 
conditions, but also punishment at the hands of  the authorities if  caught.
A principle of  humanity suggests that very good reasons must be offered to justify 
turning the disadvantaged away. It would be bad enough to meet such people with 
indifference and to deny them positive assistance. It would be even worse to deny 
them the opportunity to help themselves. To go to the length of  denying one’s fellow 
citizens the right to help those who are badly off, whether by employing them or by 
simply taking them in, seems even more difficult to justify – if, indeed, it is not entirely 
perverse.
Not all people who look to move are poor or disadvantaged. Nor do all of  them care 
about freedom. But if  freedom and humanity are important and weighty values, the 
prima facie case for open borders is a strong one, since very substantial considerations 
will have to be adduced to warrant ignoring or repudiating them. I suggest that no such 
considerations are to be found. But to show this, it is necessary to look more closely at 
arguments that restrictions of  immigration are defensible, and indeed desirable.
Economic Arguments Against Open Borders
It is sometimes argued that there are strong economic arguments for limiting immigra-
tion. There are two kinds of  concern here. The first is about the impact of  migrants on 
the local market economy: large numbers of  people entering a society can change the 
balance of  an economy, driving down wages or pushing up the prices of  some goods 
such as real estate – to the disadvantage of  many people in the native population. The 
second is about the impact of  migrants on the cost and availability of  goods and services 
supplied through the state: education, healthcare, welfare, and the publicly funded 
infrastructure of  roads, parks, and other non-excludable goods. Do these concerns 
warrant closing borders to immigrants?
In the end, the answer must be that they do not. But the reasons why are not as 
straightforward as might be anticipated. If  our concern is the impact of  migrants 
on the local market economy, one argument often advanced by economists is that, on 
balance, the net impact of  immigrants is mildly positive. While immigrants do take jobs 
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that might have gone to locals and drive down wages, while driving up some prices, 
they also have a positive impact on the economy. Migrants expand the size of  the work-
force and extend the division of  labor, so society gains from the benefits this brings. As 
new consumers, they expand the size of  the domestic market and help to lower prices 
for many goods. Measuring the precise impact of  any cohort of  immigrants is difficult; 
but the overall impact is, at best, positive and, at worst, only mildly negative – even with 
respect to employment. Moreover, the global effect of  migration is positive, as it involves 
a movement of  people from places where they are less productive and often unable to 
make a living to places where they are both more productive and better off  – and in 
many cases no longer a burden on their societies.
The problem, however, is that whatever the overall impact of  migration, particular 
persons will do badly out of  it. An influx of  cheap labor may be good for society overall, 
but bad for those who are put out of  work or forced to accept lower wages. It is to these 
people that the critic of  open borders will point to illustrate the economic costs of  
immigration. Why should they bear the costs? Equally, why should other societies be 
happy about the brain-drain that is also an aspect of  immigration, as skilled people 
leave their native countries for better opportunities abroad?
While it is true that the burdens and benefits of  immigration do not fall evenly or 
equitably on all members of  a host society, open borders are defensible nonetheless for 
a number of  reasons. First, it has to be asked why it must be assumed that locals are 
entitled to the benefits they enjoy as people who have immediate access to particular 
markets. As residents or citizens, these people enjoy the rents they secure by virtue of  an 
arrangement that excludes others from entering a particular market.1 Such arrange-
ments are commonplace in every society, and indeed in the world as a whole. Often those 
who find a resource to exploit, or a demand which they are particularly able to fulfill, are 
unable to resist the temptation to ensure that they enjoy the gains to be had in exploiting 
that resource or fulfilling that demand by preventing others from doing the same. Yet it 
is unclear that there is any principle that can justify granting to some persons privileged 
access to such rents. To be sure, many of  the most egregious examples of  rent-seeking 
(and rent-protecting) behavior are to be found in the activities of  capitalist firms and 
industries. But this does not make such activity defensible, since it serves simply to 
protect the well-off  from having to share the wealth into which they have tapped with 
those who would like to secure a little of  that same wealth for themselves.
If  we are considering labor markets, there is no good reason to exclude outsiders 
from offering their labor in competition with locals. While it may disadvantage locals 
to have to compete, it is equally true that outsiders will be disadvantaged if  they are 
forbidden to do so. Also, locals who would benefit from the greater availability of  labor 
would also be disadvantaged by the exclusion of  outsiders. To prevent, say, firms from 
hiring outside labor would be no more justifiable on economic grounds than preventing 
firms from moving their operations abroad to take advantage of  cheaper or more pro-
ductive labor in other countries.
The same arguments hold if  we are considering the case of  people who wish to move 
to a different country to sell not their labor but their wares – perhaps by setting up a 
business. There is no more a justification for preventing them from doing this than there 
is for preventing them from trading their goods from abroad. Restricting access to 
markets certainly benefits some people, but at the expense of  others, and generally 
to the disadvantage of  all. If  particular privileges should be accorded to some because 
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382  Chandran Kukathas
of  their state membership, the justification cannot be economic in the first of  the two 
senses distinguished.
In the second sense of  economic, however, the argument for restricting immigration 
is not that access to particular markets should be limited, but that the economic benefits 
dispensed by the state must be limited if  economic resources and indeed the social 
system more generally are to be properly managed. Immigration dulls the edge of  good 
husbandry. For some libertarians, the concern here is that open borders – or even 
increased immigration – will impose a greater tax burden on existing members of  
society as the poor and disabled move to states with more generous welfare provisions, 
as well as subsidized education and healthcare. Indeed, a number of  libertarians have 
argued that until the welfare state is abolished, immigration will have to be tightly 
controlled in countries like the United States (Hoppe, 1998).
Here it would not be enough to point out that, to the extent that immigrants join 
the workforce, they would also contribute to the revenues of  the state through taxes, 
even as they consume resources dispensed by the state. Open immigration might well 
encourage people to move with the intention of  taking advantage of  benefits that 
exceed their tax contributions. People on low incomes and with children or elderly or 
infirm dependents would find it advantageous to move to countries with generous 
public education and healthcare. This could impose a significant additional burden on 
taxpaying individuals and firms, or pressure a state with fiscal problems to reduce the 
quality of  its services. Immigration is a problem for welfare states – understanding 
welfare in its broadest sense to include health and education services as well as unem-
ployment relief  and disability benefits.
The problem here is a significant one. But it should be noted that it is not a problem 
that results from the movement of  the rich or able, only one that results from the move-
ment of  the poor. The independently wealthy, and the well-off  moving into well-paying 
jobs, will contribute to the state’s coffers through direct and indirect taxes, and may 
well pay for more than they consume. The poor will in all likelihood be net consumers 
of  tax dollars – at least at the outset. An important purpose of  closed borders is to keep 
out the poor.
If  the concern is to preserve the integrity of  the welfare state, however, the most that 
could be justified is restricting membership of  the welfare system. The movement of  
people into a country could then be free. Such restricted forms of  immigration would 
still impose serious disadvantages upon poorer people, for whom the attraction of  
immigration would diminish if  they were obliged to fund their own healthcare and pay 
for the education of  their children. Yet for many it would be better than no opportunity 
to move at all. Certainly, immigration with limited entitlements would be attractive to 
young and able people with dependents, since the opportunity to work abroad and 
remit money home might significantly improve all their lives.
Nonetheless, it would not do to be too sanguine about the possibility of  such an 
arrangement. Most states would baulk at the suggestion of  such arrangements, and 
even advocates of  open immigration may reject the idea of  different classes of  member-
ship. Moreover, immigrants paying taxes may feel disgruntled if  their taxes do not buy 
them equal entitlements. In the end, it may be that the existence of  the welfare state 
makes open borders, or even extensive immigration, very difficult – if  not impossible. 
From the perspective of  a principle of  freedom, or a principle of  humanity, I suggest, 
the standard of  open borders should prevail. To defend closed borders a principle of  
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nationality would have to take precedence. We should turn then to look more closely 
at the argument from nationality.
Nationality and Immigration
Implicit in most arguments for closed borders or restricted immigration is an assump-
tion that the good or well-being of  the members of  a polity should take precedence – to 
a significant degree, even if  not absolutely – over the good of  outsiders. From this per-
spective, that one of  my fellow countrymen is harmed or made worse off  is a weighty 
consideration when assessing any policy, in a way that the impact of  that policy on 
foreigners is not. Defenders of  this perspective may disagree about the extent to which 
the interests of  outsiders should be discounted; and indeed some may hold that rich 
nations owe substantial obligations of  justice to the world’s poor. But they are agreed 
that something more is owed to one’s own country and its people. And this justifies 
protecting one’s nation from the impact of  open or substantial immigration. (For con-
trasting views see Goodin, 1988; Miller, 1988.)
Immigration, on this view, may be damaging for a number of  different reasons. We 
have already considered some of  the economic consequences of  immigration; but there 
are other problems as well. First, immigration in substantial numbers, even if  it takes 
place over a long period of  time, “has the effect of  changing the recipient area” (Barry, 
1992, p. 281). The influx of  Indian workers in the nineteenth century changed Fiji 
from an island of  Polynesian people to one that is bicultural, just as the movement of  
Indians and Chinese to Malaya turned that society into a multicultural one. The fear 
of  many people is that immigration will change a society’s character, and perhaps 
undermine or displace an ancient identity (Casey, 1982). The cultural character of  
Britain or France cannot remain the same if  substantial numbers of  people move there 
from Africa or Asia.
Second, immigration from culturally different people may be damaging to wealthy 
countries to the extent that their wealth is dependent upon the existence of  a political 
culture, and economic and social institutions, that are especially conducive to wealth-
creation. Immigration from people who do not share the same values, and who would 
not help to sustain the same institutions, may ultimately undermine those institutions 
(Buchanan, 1995). If  so, this may be good reason to restrict immigration not only by 
number but also by culture.
Third, immigration may make it very difficult for a society to develop or sustain a level 
of  social solidarity that is necessary for a state to work well, and particularly for it to 
uphold principles of  social justice. This argument has been developed especially force-
fully by David Miller, who suggests that if  immigration exceeds the absorptive capacities 
of  a society, the bonds of  social solidarity may break down. The nation is a natural refer-
ence group when people ask whether or not they are getting a fair share of  society’s 
resources. If  people have different understandings of  what their rights and obligations 
are and disagree about what they may legitimately claim, it may become impossible to 
establish and operate appropriate standards of  social justice (Miller, 1995, 1999a). For 
all of  these reasons, then, open borders cannot be justified. Or so it is argued.
While all of  these considerations are weighty, they do not suffice to warrant limita-
tions on freedom of  movement. First, while it is true that immigrants do change the 
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character of  a place – sometimes dramatically – it is not evident that this is necessarily 
a bad thing. More to the point, it is difficult to know how much change is desirable, 
partly because the results will not be known for some time and partly because different 
people – even in relatively homogeneous societies – want different things. It is perfectly 
understandable that some people want things to remain the way they have been during 
their lifetimes. Yet it is no less understandable that others want changes they regard as 
improvements. The Know-Nothings of  nineteenth-century America were completely 
hostile to Catholic, and especially Irish, immigration; though Irish Americans were all 
too ready to welcome to the United States even more settlers from Ireland. In the end, 
our capacity to shape society or preserve its character may be as limited as our capacity 
to know how much (or how little) change is really desirable – even if  we could agree 
on what sort of  character we would like our societies to have.
It is also worth bearing in mind that many societies have experienced significant 
cultural or social transformations and not only survived but prospered. The United 
States in the nineteenth century welcomed immigrants from all over the world, 
incorporated large parts of  what was once Mexico into its territory, overturned a 
three-century-old tradition of  slavery and yet began the twentieth century a prosperous 
and vibrant democracy. Canada and Australia have seen their societies transformed by 
postwar immigration into multicultural polities, while continuing to enjoy economic 
growth and social stability. And the European Union continues to expand its member-
ship by admitting states from Eastern Europe – and perhaps, eventually, Turkey – in a 
way that makes it possible for peoples from diverse ethnic, religious, and political tradi-
tions to move freely from one end of  the continent to the other, without fearing a loss 
in prosperity; though there can be no doubt that this development will bring with it 
significant cultural changes to many of  Europe’s communities.
Social and cultural change can be effected by large-scale immigration, and its sig-
nificance should not be discounted. But neither should it be overestimated. Nor should 
too much weight be given to the possibility that immigration from poor nations to 
rich ones will undermine the institutions of  wealth-creation – though it is surely a pos-
sibility. If  anything, it is perhaps more likely that immigrants who move to wealthy 
countries will do so because they want to take advantage of  the opportunities it offers, 
and that they will assimilate by adopting the practices that bring success to the natives. 
In any case, if  our interest is in wealth-creation, it is more likely that this skill will be 
taught to those who enter a rich country than that it will be exported successfully to 
some countries that are poor.
The most challenging argument against open immigration, however, is that in -
stitutions of  social justice can only be built if  social solidarity is preserved – and that 
immigration may undermine that solidarity if  it is not appropriately restricted. If  we 
accept that social justice is an important concern, then Miller’s analysis and argument 
are powerful and convincing. The only way to resist them is to question the very idea 
that the nation-state is the appropriate site for the settlement of  questions of  distributive 
justice. And indeed that is what we need to do.
There are a number of  reasons why we should be suspicious of  the idea that the 
nation-state is the site of  distributive justice, but the most powerful have been advanced 
by Miller in his own critique of  the idea of  global social justice. Miller maintains that 
principles of  social justice are always, “as a matter of  psychological fact, applied within 
bounded communities” (1999a, p. 18). It is easier for us to make judgments of  justice 
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in small communities such as workplaces, but difficult in units larger than nation-
states. We make such judgments by comparing ourselves with others. But it is difficult 
for us to compare ourselves with people who are remote from our own circumstances, 
such as people in other countries. We can more readily make judgments based on com-
parisons with people who belong to our own reference group – people with whom we 
are likely to share some common conceptions of  value. When conceptions of  the value 
of  a resource differ, it becomes very difficult to establish common standards of  distribu-
tive justice, since the very question of  what counts as a resource to be distributed may 
be impossible to settle. And when we consider that different communities have conflict-
ing views about how trade-offs should be made, for example, between the consumption 
of  what the earth will produce and the preservation of  the natural environment, it 
would be difficult for one community to demand a share of  another’s resources on the 
basis of  its own determination of  the “true value” of  those resources (Miller, 1999b, 
pp. 193–196). Global social justice is difficult to defend.
Yet all the things that make global justice problematic also go to make problematic 
social justice within the nation-state. Certainly, some nation-states are so large that it 
is difficult to see how they could really share a single conception of  social justice. China 
and India between them hold more than a third of  the world’s population, and harbor 
different languages, religions, and customs. Even the United States, though much 
smaller, is sufficiently diverse that there are noticeable differences among significant 
groups about morality and justice – from California, to Utah, to Louisiana. Britain and 
France are smaller still, but are home to a diversity of  religions and ethnicities. If  the 
preservation of  a shared ethos or sense of  social justice is an important reason to 
restrict immigration, then, it might be defensible if  we are considering small, homoge-
neous nations such as Iceland or Tahiti. It might also be defensible for a state such as 
Israel, though it might be more difficult to make this case the more it is a multicultural 
(or bicultural) state. But in larger states, which are diverse and already have a long 
history of  immigration, the idea of  a shared conception of  social justice might be too 
much to hope for. Certainly, the vigorous debates among philosophers about social 
justice suggest that there is no substantial agreement on this question even among a 
group as homogeneous as the academy. Miller’s point about the nature of  social justice 
is a telling one; but it also tells against his own defense of  restricted immigration. (For 
a fuller critique of  Miller’s view, see also Kukathas, 2002.)
Even if  states were plausible sites of  social justice, however, there is another issue 
that has to be raised. Is it right that the preservation of  local institutions of  social justice 
take precedence over the humanitarian concerns that make open immigration desira-
ble? As was noted earlier, immigration barriers operate largely to limit the movement 
of  the world’s poor. It seems odd to suggest that this can be defended by appeal to the 
importance of  social justice. If  the price of  social justice is exclusion of  the worst-off  
from the lands that offer the greatest opportunity, this may be a mark against the ideal 
of  social justice.
To be fair, however, it should be acknowledged that defenders of  social justice or the 
primacy of  membership (Walzer, 1983) generally acknowledge the need to make special 
provision for the world’s poor. In this regard, they suggest that refugees may have a 
special claim to be allowed to immigrate and resettle to escape persecution. But here 
a number of  problems arise. First, the line distinguishing a refugee and what we might 
term an “economic migrant” is a very fine one. As it stands, the 1951 United Nations 
<i>Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics</i>, edited by Andrew I. Cohen, and Christopher Heath Wellman, John Wiley & Sons,
         Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=1597998.
Created from smu on 2019-10-16 19:53:11.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
3.
 J
oh
n 
W
ile
y 
& 
So
ns
, I
nc
or
po
ra
te
d.
 A
ll r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
386  Chandran Kukathas
Convention relating to the Status of  Refugees adopts a very narrow definition of  refugee 
to include only persons with a well-founded fear of  persecution for reasons of  race, 
religion, nationality, membership of  a particular social group or political opinion. 
Those people fleeing war, natural disaster, or famine are, on this definition, not refugees. 
Second, even on this narrow definition, at the start of  the twenty-first century, there 
are more than 20 million people in the world who count as refugees who have yet to 
be resettled. The problem these two points pose is that making an exception for refugees 
requires a very significant increase in immigration – even if  the narrow definition of  
refugee is used. If  a more humane definition were adopted – one that recognized as 
refugees people fleeing war zones, for example – an even greater number of  immigrants 
would have to be accepted. Yet then, if  the standard of  humanity is the appropriate 
standard, it is difficult to see why any sharp distinction should be made between the 
desperate fleeing war and the destitute struggling to make a living.
It would perhaps be too much to hope or expect that states – especially wealthy 
ones – will readily lower the barriers to the free movement of  peoples. As it stands, the 
world of  states has struggled to relocate the refugees for whom it has acknowledged 
responsibility. Indeed, it is sobering to remember that immigration controls were 
tightened with the invention of  the passport during the First World War precisely to 
control refugee flows. Nonetheless, on this much at least, both the defenders of  open 
borders and the advocates of  restrictions can agree: that at present the borders are too 
securely sealed.
Immigration and Security
One reason for greater restriction of  immigration, which clearly has assumed enor-
mous significance in recent times, is the need for security. Can immigration be free in 
an age of  terror?
Security from terrorist attack, it should be noted, is only one kind of  security. Even 
before terror became a serious concern, modern states have been anxious about the 
security of  political systems from foreign threats, and the security of  society against 
international criminal organizations. Smugglers, traffickers in illegal goods (from drugs 
to rare wildlife to historical artifacts), and slave-traders of  various kinds operate across 
boundaries to violate the laws of  host states. Nonetheless, the threat of  terror has added 
significantly to the security concerns of  a number of  western states. Does this give us 
greater reason to restrict immigration, or show that the idea of  open borders is simply 
untenable?
In the end, I suggest that security concerns do not do much to diminish the case for 
open borders. This is not to say that security concerns are unfounded or should not be 
addressed. But it is to say that immigration controls are not they key. There are a number 
of  reasons why. First, while it is easy to restrict legal immigration, it is another matter to 
control illegal immigration. Limiting legal immigration is unlikely to deter either crimi-
nals or subversive agents from moving between states. Borders are porous even when 
they are closed. Second, limiting immigration seldom means limiting the movement of  
people more generally, since many more people move from one country to another as 
tourists, or students, or businessmen, or government officials than they do as immi-
grants intending to settle in a new land. If  security is a concern, tourism should be more 
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severely limited in many countries than it presently is. If  a person is likely to pose a threat 
to a country’s security, it would be odd to think it acceptable for him to be granted a 
tourist visa for one, three, or six months. Equally, if  a person is considered safe to be 
awarded a three-month tourist visa, it is hard to see why he should be denied the right 
to permanent residence on security grounds. It might well be that in times of  insecurity 
greater vigilance is necessary: greater scrutiny of  many aspects of  the behavior of  
people – including travelers – may be warranted, just as one would expect the police to 
establish road blocks and search cars when there is an escaped criminal in the vicinity. 
It is not evident, however, that this would justify further restrictions on immigration 
rather than simply greater effort to discover who poses a threat to society, to try avert the 
threat, and to apprehend the particular persons who are menaces.
There are, however, reasons not to place too much weight on the importance of  secu-
rity, for like all things, the search for security comes with costs of  its own. In the case of  
the search for security through immigration controls, the cost is borne not only in the 
financial expense that is incurred but also in the impact that controls on immigrants and 
immigration have on society more generally. Immigration control requires the surveil-
lance of  people moving in and out of  the country, and to some degree of  people moving 
about within the country. But it is not possible to do this with immigrants or outsiders 
generally without also placing one’s own citizens under surveillance. In dangerous 
times this may be unavoidable, at least to some degree. But the risks it brings are sub-
stantial. Even if  the burdens imposed upon citizens and residents are trivial, they may 
be burdens all the same – and for some more than others. Furthermore, there is always 
a risk that impositions designed to meet a particular danger will remain in place long 
after the danger has passed. (Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, which, among other 
things, sanctions arrest and detention without trial, was passed at the height of  the 
communist insurgency in the 1960s, but remains in place 25 years after the emergency 
ended.) Liberal democracies, in particular, should be wary of  state controls advocated in 
the name of  national security – particularly since the trade-off  is a loss of  liberty.
Concluding Reflections
Whatever the merits of  the case for open borders, it is highly unlikely that we will see 
an end to immigration controls at any time soon – for reasons that were canvassed at 
the beginning of  this chapter. In one important respect, free migration is entirely unfea-
sible: it is politically untenable.
One reason why it is politically untenable is that most voters in wealthy countries 
do not favor immigration, particularly by the poor. Another is that states themselves 
do not favor uncontrolled population movements. In a world order shaped by the 
Westphalian model of  states operating within strict geographical boundaries, and 
dominated by the imperative to secure the welfare of  members, the free movement of  
peoples is not a strong possibility. The inclination of  most people to hold on to the 
advantages they possess also makes it unlikely that nations will open up their borders 
to allow others to come and take a greater share of  what they control.
Yet if  the free movement of  peoples is not politically feasible, how can there be a case 
for open borders? Surely, political theory, in considering issues of  public policy, should 
keep its focus on the world of  the possible rather than on impossible ideals.
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There is a good deal of  truth to this. But there is, nonetheless, good reason for putting 
the case for open immigration. One important consideration is that many feasibility 
problems have their roots not in the nature of  things but in our way of  thinking about 
them. Many of  the reasons open immigration is not possible right now have less to do 
with the disadvantages it might bring than with an unwarranted concern about its 
dangers. Even to the extent that the source of  the problem for open immigration lies in 
the nature of  things, however, it is worth considering the case for open borders because 
it forces us to confront the inconsistency between moral ideals and our existing social 
and political arrangements. One of  the reasons why open immigration is not possible 
is that it is not compatible with the modern welfare state. While one obvious response 
to this is to say, “so much the worse for open immigration,” it is no less possible to ask 
whether the welfare state is what needs rethinking.
Note
1 “Rent” is money someone pays to have access to some capital asset (such as land, a dwelling, 
or a means of  transport) that he or she does not, or cannot, own outright. Persons who 
engage in “rent-seeking” seek money from rents instead of  from profits or wage income.
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